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Abstract 
In this paper, I examine the rhetoric employed by court judgments, with a particular emphasis on the narrative 
construct of the ‘passive patient’. This construction advances and reinforces paternalistic values, which have scant 
regard for the patients’ preferences, values, or choices within the legal context. Further, I critique the rhetoric 
employed and argue that the use of this rhetoric is the basis for a precedent that limits the understanding and 
respect of patients. Through this paper, I present the contemporary use of the ‘passive patient’ construct in the 
context of the Indian legal system and describe how such constructions have become a source of normative 
justification for legal reasoning that jeopardizes the patient’s agency. I argue for the primacy of ‘respect for 
persons’ within Indian law and the need to treat each patient as a person who has agency, preferences, and values 
during clinical interactions. I conclude by suggesting that laws that adopt narratives that acknowledging the 
significance of patient engagement and the relevance of effective communication during clinical encounters would 
help cultivate a culture of patient-centred care, by moving beyond the rhetoric of ‘passive patients’ and the 
‘health/choice’ dichotomy. 
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Introduction 
 
The need to shift from a paternalistic approach to a patient-centred approach for both clinical practice and law has 
been well-recognized within the bioethics, medico-legal, and health services research literature (Brazier and Miola 
2000; Edozien 2015; Saha, Beach, and Cooper 2008; Brazier and Lobjoit 2005; Groll 2014; Manson and O’Neill 
2007; Macklin 1999; Entwistle et al. 2010). This shift can be achieved through the recognition of specific 
concepts, such as autonomy, self-determination, person-/patient-centred care, dignity, and human rights. In the 
bioethics and medico-legal literature, particularly during medical decision-making contexts, the concepts of 
‘patient autonomy’ and ‘self-determination’ have been widely recognized as being necessary to avoid paternalism 
and to protect the patients’ autonomous choices. One method for protecting autonomous choices would be to 
uphold the doctrine of ‘informed consent’, which is based on the philosophical idea of ‘respect for autonomy’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Faden, Beauchamp, and King 1986; Faden et al. 1981; Berg et al. 2001). These 
concepts are based on liberal ‘world views’ and the characterization of patients as competent adults who are 
capable of making their own decisions. Thus, the presumed concept of a patient in most of these discussions is 
that of a ‘competent adult, who can make autonomous choices’.  
 
Although patient rights, patient-centred care, and autonomy debates have been well-received, through multiple 
efforts focused on moving away from paternalism during both law and clinical practice reforms, a persistent 
asymmetry remains during clinical interactions. These studies observe lack of ‘patient engagement’, where 
healthcare professionals do not acknowledge patients’ values or preferences, and do not treat patients and family 
members with respect and dignity (Subramani 2018, 2017; Frosch et al. 2012; Pilnick and Dingwall 2011). The 
persistence of asymmetry during clinical interactions, which prevent the practice of patient-centred care and 
sustain paternalism and disrespectful attitudes, are often caused by the limited availability of resources, including 
human resources, and time, implicit biases, and socio-economic factors (Willems et al. 2005a; Van Ryn and Burke 
2000; Subramani 2018; Pilnick and Dingwall 2011; Blumenthal-Barby 2017). However, the fundamental 
assumptions that these debates rely on are often neglected. In this paper, I examine the assumptions built into 
current laws, based on rhetoric and the narratives that form particular ‘world views’ regarding patients and doctors, 
that sustain the power asymmetry within doctor-patient relationships. I intend to illustrate how pervasive 
paternalistic values, expressed through the rhetorical construct of ‘passive patients’ in legal reasoning associated 
with Indian medical negligence cases, inhibit the acknowledgement of the patients’ agency or denying their 
abilities to have preferences and values. To achieve reform within the law, the critical understanding of 
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assumptions and constructions that influence judicial decision-making processes is necessary (Frohmann and 
Mertz 1994; White 1985; Anleu 2000; Ehrlich and Ziegert 2001; Rosenberg 1993; Bourdieu 1987). Therefore, I 
shall focus on the rhetoric within the law to illustrate how a ‘patient’ is defined through the adoption of specific 
legal reasoning (White 1985; Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites 1996; Wetlaufer 1990). Although global bioethics 
debates have established that doctors and health professionals are ethically and legally obligated to recognize 
patients’ values, preferences, and choices and to validate patients as agents who have both the ‘capacity’ and 
‘ability’ to make their own decisions, in this paper, I argue that this rhetoric has failed to resonate within the law, 
particularly within the Indian legal context. An examination of medical negligence cases revealed two major 
constructs: ‘passive patient’ and ‘doctor knows best’ (Subramani, 2019)1. This rhetoric advances the paternalistic 
views regarding the respective roles of doctors and patients and limits patients’ agency, values, and choices in the 
context of Indian medical negligence cases.  
 
I consider law to not only reflect legal rules and policies but also to tell stories and provide explanations; thus 
examining the narratives and rhetorical reflections built into the constructions that are embedded in legal 
judgements capture the stories and explanations meant to reflect legal rules and policies (Brooks and Gewirtz 
1998; Hunter and Cowan 2007; White 1985; Wetlaufer 1990). Drawing on previous rhetorical studies (Jackson 
1996; White 1985; Hunter and Cowan 2007; Ehrlich and Ziegert 2001; Charland 1987) and employing 
constructivist interpretive framework (Schwandt 1998; Charmaz 2006), I attempted to explore the socially 
constructed narrative of presumed assumptions within court judgements. By understanding that law draws from 
and contributes to our understanding of the moral premises of a given culture, the narratives and rhetoric within 
landmark judgements are appropriate sites of inquiry because they provide a view of the preferred dominant 
values. Furthermore, as Charland (1987) and Anleu (2000) have argued, the court’s opinion has real consequences 
and implications. Court judgements are significant for medico-legal debates and medical ethics because they often 
include concepts or images of the ‘patient’ that become part of the rhetorical framework of reasoning, such as 
during debates about patient rights. Recently, some studies have focused on how a ‘patient’ is framed during 
healthcare law debates, particularly in English courts (Montgomery 2017; Purshouse 2018; Montgomery and 
Montgomery 2016; Heywood 2015). The formulations in law, through the moral and legal significance that they 
                                               
1 One of the objectives of my doctoral study was to analyse Indian medical negligence cases, particularly consent 
cases, to understand the underlying ethical and legal values and principles of ‘consent’. I had employed critical 
legal hermeneutic method along with textual content analysis (Danelski 1965; Dworkin 1986; Elo and Kyngäs 
2008; Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Moloney 2001). More details of the analysis is provided in (Subramani 2019). 
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convey, can endorse certain notions regarding the society they draw from and contribute to the public rhetorical 
culture (Hasian, Condit, and Lucaites 1996; White 1985; Charland 1987). In this paper, I will capture the 
constructed narratives that refer to evaluative judgements, based on the learned judges’ perceptions, values, and 
presumed understandings. Through this process, I will illustrate how the dominant rhetorical arguments and 
narratives are created and sustained within the legal reasoning. Drawing upon the existing literature that has 
examined assumptions regarding ‘patients’, the persistence of asymmetry during doctor-patient interactions, and 
patient-centred approaches, I will explore the dominant rhetoric currently expressed in the Indian legal context 
and discuss its implications.  
 
This paper is divided into two major sections. In the first section, I have included excerpts from a landmark 
judgement of the Supreme Court of India, Samira Kohli vs. Prabha Manchanda (Dr.) and another, 2008, to 
present the dominant narratives and rhetoric found in court judgements associated with medical negligence cases 
in India and their implications. By exploring these narratives, I present how these constructions have become the 
source for normative justifications of legal reasoning, which jeopardizes patients’ agency. In the second section, 
I argue for the primacy of ‘respect for persons’ within the law in the Indian setting and for the need to recognize 
each patient as a ‘person’ and an ‘agent’ who has preferences, by moving beyond the notion of ‘doctor knows 
best’. I conclude this paper by suggesting that a legal narrative that acknowledges the significance of ‘patient 
engagement’ and the relevance of ‘effective communication’ during clinical encounters, will cultivate a culture 
of ‘patient-centred care’ within the persistently asymmetrical healthcare system, by moving beyond the rhetoric 
of ‘passive patients’ and the false dichotomy between physical health and patient choice.  
 
The Mandate of ‘Patienthood’ 
Before examining the rhetoric that informs court judgements of medical negligence cases in India, I will briefly 
discuss the context surrounding these narratives. Many studies have established that asymmetry exists in the 
doctor-patient relationship, including larger social inequalities, and have examined the nature of clinical 
interactions to suggest  various methods for achieving patient-centred care (Entwistle et al. 2008; Smith-Oka 
2015; Makoul and Clayman 2006; Ishikawa, Hashimoto, and Kiuchi 2013; Schermer 2002; Roter 1977; Freidson 
1970; Subramani 2018). Few scholars question the persistence of this asymmetry during clinical interactions, and 
some have suggested that the phenomenon of asymmetry should be viewed as a function of social and 
organizational embeddedness (Pilnick and Dingwall 2011; Heritage and Maynard 2006; Parsons 1951, 1975; 
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Bunn 2011). Further, scholars have suggested that this asymmetry is indicative of the exercise of power and 
existing medical authority, suggesting that medicine is a normative order-maintaining enterprise that results in 
patients exhibiting ‘sick role’ and ‘illness behaviour’ (Parsons 1975; Collyer 2018; Sigerist 1960). Other studies 
have questioned the phenomenon of ‘sick role’’ because it ‘advocated conformity and passivity and denied the 
importance to individual agency’ (Burnham 2013; Young 2004). 
The reference to the ‘patient role’ is based on the perceptions, assumptions, the existing asymmetry of the doctor-
patient relationship, and the resistance to paternalism and the embrace of patients’ rights has been observed within 
court judgements. For example, the excerpt from Lord Bridge’s judgement in the Bolam case (as cited in Samira 
Kohli’s case) illustrates this narrative and juxtaposes American and British standpoints regarding consent to 
treatment and information disclosure debates. 
I recognize the logical force of the Canterbury doctrine, proceeding from the premise that the 
patient's right to make his own decision must at all costs be safeguarded against the kind of 
medical paternalism which assumes that ‘doctor knows best’. But, with all respect, I regard 
the doctrine as quite impractical in application (p.13). 
The patient as ‘passive’, ‘ignorant’, ‘helpless’, and ‘vulnerable’ and of the doctor’s role as restoring ‘health’ in 
the ‘best interests of patients’ has been observed and discussed in the context of both clinical practice and the law 
(Hunter and Cowan 2007; Secker 1999; Smith-Oka 2015; Montgomery 2017; Montgomery and Montgomery 
2016; Mocherla, Raman, and Holden 2011; MaClean 2005). Amsterdam and Burner (2001) stated,  
familiarity is dulling—that when our ways of conceiving of things become routine, they 
disappear from consciousness and we cease to know that we are thinking in a certain way or 
why we are doing so…to make the familiar strange again, to rescue the taken-for-granted and 
bring it back into mind…The practice of law is full of such dissociated routines, of canonical 
ways of proceeding ‘scarcely worth a moment’s thought’ (p.1).  
With this background, now I turn to the law, to examine the dominant narratives and rhetoric found in court 
judgements to examine the pervasiveness of roles and assumptions associated with the mandate of expected 
‘patienthood’, which is discursively constructed. In the next section, I will provide brief background information 
for Samira Kohli vs. Dr. Prabha Manchanda, 2008, as this case represents the current precedent case that is 
referred to during medical negligence cases associated with consent and information disclosure issues. In this 
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case, the construction and image of a ‘patient’ played a significant role in the legal reasoning. I will then present 
the dominant rhetoric and narratives surrounding the concept of ‘patients’ during doctor-patient relationships and 
clinical interactions, in the Indian context. 
The Samira Kohli case and the concept of a ‘patient’ 
The idea of autonomy is one of the central moral justifications currently discussed in bioethics debates regarding 
the transition away from paternalism, and informed consent plays a significant role in respect for autonomy and 
the autonomous choices of patients (Bullock 2018; Beauchamp and Childress 2013). As mentioned in the 
Introduction section, the underlying concept of a patient in these debates is that of a ‘competent adult who can 
make autonomous choices’. In law, the self-determination of an individual is based on this concept of a patient. 
Given this background, I use the Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchanda, 2008 case to explore the concept of a 
patient in Indian court judgments, while engaging in the concept of consent, to illustrate how these ideas influence 
the legal reasoning. The Samira Kohli case is the first case that explicitly discussed ‘real or valid consent’, based 
on the English court’s Bolam case2, and it has been adopted as the basis for Indian medical negligence cases 
(Subramani 2017). To date, this case remains the precedent for medical negligence and consent cases. Samira 
Kohli, a 44-year-old unmarried woman, consulted Dr. Manchanda, complaining of prolonged menstrual bleeding. 
The doctor removed the patient’s uterus (abdominal hysterectomy), ovaries, and fallopian tubes (bilateral 
salpingo-oopherectomy), without obtaining specific consent from the patient. The Supreme Court held the doctor 
guilty of negligence and allowed Rs. 25000, as compensation to the victim. I have elsewhere discussed and 
critiqued this case, in detail (Subramani 2017). 
 
In this case, the judgment not only provided details regarding the specific consent that should be obtained before 
surgery but also elaborated on the meaning of consent and the nature of information disclosure that should be 
adopted in the Indian context. These guidelines were based on preceding cases from the UK (as cited in Samira 
Kohli case): Bolam vs. Friern Hospital Management Committee 1957 and Sidaway vs. Board of Governors of the 
Bethlem Royal Hospital 1985. The judgement consciously preferred the concept of ‘real or valid consent’, which 
evolved during the Bolam case, in contrast with ‘informed consent’, which emerged in the American Canterbury 
case. This decision was made with reference to the ‘ground realities’ of healthcare in India.  
                                               
2 For further detailed understanding of the Bolam test for consent discussions, refer to (Brazier and Miola 2000; 
Maclean 2004, 2009; Brazier and Cave 1992) 
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During bioethics and legal debates, the preferred consent test is based on the patient standard, and physicians are 
obligated to facilitate the patients’ requirements for informative materials prior to making a decision. Here, the 
patients’ rights for self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal (Faden et al., 1986; Maclean, 2009; 
McLean, 2010). In the Bolam case, from the UK, the concept of consent and information disclosure was based on 
the ‘medical professional standard’. This decision has been recently overturned in the 2015 Montgomery case, 
which departed from the long-held position of a reasonable body of medical opinion and recognized that the values 
of patients should be acknowledged; thus, the test for material information disclosure is based on either a 
‘reasonable person’ or the ‘particular patient’. Although some scholars have argued that this standard emphasizes 
patient autonomy over medical paternalism and view it as a welcome development (Edozien 2015; Farrell and 
Brazier 2016; Foster 2015), others have critically disputed this emphasis (Dunn et al. 2018; Montgomery and 
Montgomery 2016). The debates regarding ‘informed consent’ within both the law and clinical practice, including 
the standards for information disclosure, appear to be never-ending due to the nuances and complexities associated 
with this idea; however, these debates have drawn my attention to the construction of a ‘patient’.  
 
Landmark cases, such as Bolam, Sidaway, Montgomery, Schloendorff, Canterbury, and Rogers, have influenced 
the setting of standards and have contributed to the conceptual development of ‘consent’ in medico-legal debates. 
I observe that the fundamental assumptions and concepts that surround ‘patients’ and ‘doctor-patient 
relationships’ have significantly influenced the push for certain concepts and standards in legal debates. Thus, the 
concept of a ‘patient’ that can be found in court judgements and in judges’ narratives plays a significant role 
within the legal context and can cause a paradigm shift within both legal and bioethical debates. Therefore, in the 
next section, I closely examine the narratives and constructs surrounding ‘patients’, which have influenced the 
adoption of the ‘medical professional standard’ in Indian medical negligence cases, especially in the context of 
consent to treatment and information disclosures. By uncovering the narratives and rhetoric that affect the legal 
reasoning, I intend to identify the default concepts that must be changed to perpetuate specific values during legal 
reform. 
The rhetoric of the ‘passive patient’ and in the ‘best interests of the patient’ 
Compared with the validation of patients as ‘agents’ who have the ‘right’ to be informed regarding treatment 
decisions, as individuals who have ‘ability’ to be part of medical decision making, and as ‘right holders’ in the 
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bioethics literature, I state that this narrative has failed in Indian court judgements. An examination of the judicial 
reasoning expressed in the Samira Kohli case reveals two dominant constructs, which also permeate other 
contested consent cases: the ‘passive patient’ and the ‘best interests of the patient’. These constructs are central 
to judgements that employ the ‘medical framework’ to clinical interactions, consent, and information disclosure 
issues in the Indian context, where physical health and bodily integrity are given significance (Subramani 2017). 
In Samira Kohli’s case, the justification for the application of the Bolam test or the medical professional standard 
with regards to consent to treatment and information disclosure references the ‘ground realities’ of India, 
represented by poverty, illiteracy, and the respect and trust shown to doctors. The below excerpt illustrates this 
explicitly: 
(26) In India, majority of citizens requiring medical care and treatment fall below the poverty 
line. Most of them are illiterate or semi-literate. They cannot comprehend medical terms, 
concepts, and treatment procedures. They cannot understand the functions of various organs 
or the effect of removal of such organs. They do not have access to effective but costly 
diagnostic procedures. Poor patients lying in the corridors of hospitals after admission for 
want of beds or patients waiting for days on the roadside for an admission or a mere 
examination, is a common sight. For them, any treatment with reference to rough and ready 
diagnosis based on their outward symptoms and doctor's experience or intuition is acceptable 
and welcome so long as it is free or cheap; and whatever the doctor decides as being in their 
interest, is usually unquestioningly accepted (p.13)3.  
In addition to the narrative of poverty and illiteracy, a larger narrative demonstrates the prejudicial concept of 
‘individuals’ who get ‘free or cheap’ service and that do not ask questions about because they have ‘implicit faith’ 
in doctors who decide in their ‘best interests’. The judgement stated: 
They are a passive, ignorant and uninvolved in treatment procedures. The poor and needy face 
a hostile medical environment - inadequacy in the number of hospitals and beds, non-
availability of adequate treatment facilities, utter lack of qualitative treatment, corruption, 
callousness and apathy. Many poor patients with serious ailments (e.g. heart patients and 
cancer patients) have to wait for months for their turn even for diagnosis, and due to limited 
                                               
3 All the excerpts are from Samira Kohli v. Dr. Prabha Manchanda, 2008 case, MANU/SC/0430/2008 
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treatment facilities, many die even before their turn comes for treatment. What choice do these 
poor patients have? Any treatment of whatever degree, is a boon or a favour, for them. The 
stark reality is that for a vast majority in the country, the concepts of informed consent or any 
form of consent, and choice in treatment, have no meaning or relevance (p.13). 
Here, ‘they’ refers to patients, describing a broad view of individuals who are perceived as ‘passive, ignorant and 
uninvolved’ in the decision-making process. This perception is justified by socio-economic and cultural contexts 
and the understanding of an inherently asymmetric doctor-patient relationship. In the judgement, another major 
narrative is that ‘there is a need to keep the cost of treatment within affordable limits. Bringing in the American 
concepts and standards of treatment procedures and disclosure of risks, consequences and choices will inevitably 
bring in higher cost-structure of American medical care’ (p.15). The judgement stressed the ‘scare resource’ 
context to justify why the ‘American view’ cannot be adopted within the Indian context. The below excerpt 
reflects the rhetoric of ‘Indian patients’ who have ‘implicit faith and trust’ in doctors along, with a reference to 
the larger narrative of a ‘noble’ profession that demonstrates ‘care’. 
Patients in India cannot afford them. People in India still have great regard and respect for 
Doctors. The Members of medical profession have also, by and large, shown care and concern 
for the patients. There is an atmosphere of trust and implicit faith in the advice given by the 
Doctor. The India psyche rarely questions or challenges the medical advice. Having regard to 
the conditions obtaining in India, as also the settled and recognized practices of medical 
fraternity in India, we are of the view that to nurture the doctor-patient relationship on the 
basis of trust, the extent and nature of information required to be given by doctors should 
continue to be governed by the Bolam test …It is for the doctor to decide, with reference to 
the condition of the patient, nature of illness, and the prevailing established practices, how 
much information regarding risks and consequences should be given to the patients, and how 
they should be couched, having the best interests of the patient (p.15). 
 
The above excerpt capture the larger narratives of ‘passive patients’ and ‘best interests of the patients’ that are 
used to justify the legal reasoning and standards adopted within the Indian legal context. The central theme of 
Samira Kohli was the apotheosis of the ‘doctor’ by rhetorically constructing the ‘passive patient’, which was 
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ascribed to the ‘ground realities’ in the Indian context. The significant narrative of the judgement revolved around 
the socio-economic conditions, the ‘noble’ profession of medical doctors, and the significance of nurturing the 
doctor-patient relationship, based on ‘implicit trust’. The law constructs narratives that are presented as 
authoritative; therefore, in this judgement and those associated with other medical negligence cases, the lengthy 
narrative and rhetoric surrounding the significance of the doctors’ roles and the nobility of the medical profession 
reflect the desire to increase the acceptance of  ‘medical authority’ because doctors are viewed as ‘professional 
experts’ in the court of law. The references to ‘doctor knows best’ or doctors acting in the ‘best interest of patients’ 
are rhetorically conflated to support the use of the medical professional standard, which consider the doctor to be 
better suited to make medical decisions than patients, and the construction of the ‘passive patient’ does not provide 
patients with any role during the process. The below excerpt demonstrates how the judicial reasoning justifies the 
constructed narrative of the ‘passive patient’, who does not have any agency during decision-making processes 
and adheres to the larger concept of ‘medical authority’, in which the doctor always acts in the best interests of 
the patient. This excerpt also reflects the underlying moral judgements being made by the judge/s, who justifies 
the doctor’s concept of a ‘patient’. Furthermore, the statements provide insight into the commonly held 
‘stereotypical’ understanding regarding the status of being an ‘unmarried woman’ of a particular age and how that 
affects authority regarding her body and choice. 
The respondent did it in the interest of the appellant. As the appellant was already 44 years 
old and was having serious menstrual problems, the respondent thought that by surgical 
removal of uterus and ovaries she was providing permanent relief. It is also possible that the 
respondent thought that the appellant may approve the additional surgical procedure when she 
regained consciousness and the consent by appellant's mother gave her authority. This is a 
case of respondent acting in excess of consent but in good faith and for the benefit of the 
appellant. Though the appellant has alleged that she had to undergo Hormone Therapy, no 
other serious repercussions is made out as a result of the removal. The appellant was already 
fast approaching the age of menopause and in all probability required such Hormone Therapy. 
Even assuming that AH-BSO surgery was not immediately required, there was a reasonable 
certainty that she would have ultimately required the said treatment for a complete cure (p. 
23).  
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The above excerpt illustrates the construction of the ‘patient’, which is based on set prejudices within a particular 
context and the concept of the doctor-patient relationship, in which the patient is not given any ‘agency’ or 
‘choices’ during the decision-making process. For instance, the judge justified the actions of the doctor as having 
been performed in ‘good faith and [for the] benefit’ of the patient because the patient was a 44-year-old woman 
and did not require a uterus, based on the cultural presumption that women of that age do not require the uterus. 
Although the specific consent to additional surgery has been recognized to within the context of ‘real or valid 
consent’, the rhetoric in this judgement describes a doctor who acted based on the ‘best interest of the patient’ for 
the ‘better’ health of the patient. Further, the above excerpt also captures the ultimate authority granted to the 
medical doctor over his/her patient’s body and the assumptions made in the judgement that do not consider the 
patient’s choices or preferences for her body. This landmark judgement defends the doctor’s role and authority, 
as well as the ‘implicit faith’ in medical professionals, by downplaying the role of the patient’s choices or values, 
and justifies this defence by citing the ‘ground realities’ within the Indian context. The concluding remarks of the 
judgement do not engage with or reflect on patients’ rights or patients’ preferences, values, and choices. Instead, 
the judgement empathizes with the doctor and affirms the moral regime of ‘doctor knows best’, assuming that the 
doctor acted in the ‘best interest’, regardless of the values or choices of the patients. The significance of this 
medical authority over patients is that it establishes patients as being ‘passive’ as not having the ‘ability’ to take 
part in medical decisions. The judgement does not consider or engage with patients’ values, preferences, and 
choices with regards to consent for treatment or information disclosure when it narrows the understanding of 
‘information disclosure’ to the jurisdiction of medicine, which limits the role of the patient and his/her values. 
The rhetorical focus of ‘doctor knows best’ or that doctors act in the ‘best interests of the patient’ because the 
doctor represents the authority for medical knowledge and is necessary for the ‘better health’ of the patient, 
removes the patient’s authority and redefines the role of the patient as ‘passive’ within the medical decision-
making process. The portrayal of the ‘passive patient’ silences the patient’s stories, values, preferences, and 
choices, which should instead be considered during the medical decision-making process.  
 
Construction of the ‘passive patient’: Justifying the denial of ‘agency’  
  
The Samira Kohli judgement provides a rich understanding of the concepts of the ‘patient’ and patients’ rights 
that are expressed in court judgements. The constructed ‘patient’ within the law is the product of legal reasoning 
and justification, and the analysis of the narrative and rhetorical properties in judgements can provide an unseen 
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judicial opinion (Amsterdam and Bruner 2001). As White (1985) suggested,  the analysis of legal judgements 
involves unpacking the rhetorical meanings that are created through the political and ethical assessments of the 
context. Although the language of patients’ rights has been used to deploy the doctrine of ‘real or valid consent’ 
within the Indian context, uncovering the rhetorical meaning within the judgement suggests that the court instead 
advances the understanding of ‘medical authority’ and the ‘passive patient role’ within the medical decision-
making context. The court’s approach privileges the ‘medical authority’ by focusing on the ‘health’ of the patient 
as the fundamental role of medicine, removing the patient’s values, preferences, and choices from the decision-
making process. Consequently, the rhetorical choices and narratives found in the judgement have profound 
symbolic effects on the concept of the ‘patient’. The philosophy of ‘doctors know best’ and the characterization 
of ‘passive patients’ as unquestioning individuals reveals an understanding of patients who are ‘incapable’ 
decision-makers. Rather than treating patients as ‘agents’ who are independent decision-makers within the 
medical framework, the rhetoric of ‘medical authority’ figures acting in the ‘best interests of the patient’ to protect 
the ‘health’ of the patient is established in the court judgement, which also reaffirms the patients’ ‘socio-economic 
conditions’ and the role of ‘better health’ as reasons not to focus on the values of the ‘patient’.  
 
The rhetoric in Samira Kohli advances the dichotomy of  the ‘health/choice’ approach to patient rights, where the 
focus is explicitly placed on ‘physical/bodily health’ by recognizing ‘bodily integrity’ by requiring specific 
consent to additional surgeries while simultaneously displacing the values, preferences, and choices of the patient 
away from bodily integrity (Subramani 2017). The concept of bodily integrity in Indian law can best be understood 
as ‘a right to be free from physical interference’, which was stated in Feldman’s magnum opus, Civil Liberties 
and Human Rights in England and Wales (Feldman, 1993, p. 241). This concept covers negative liberties, 
including ‘freedom from physical assaults, torture, medical or other experimentation, immunization and 
compelled eugenic or social sterilization, and cruel or degrading treatment or punishment. It also encompasses 
some positive duties on the state to protect people against inference by others’ (Feldman, 1993, p. 241). Here, I 
distinguish the concept of ‘bodily integrity’ from the concept of ‘bodily autonomy’, wherein the latter emphasizes 
the exercise of choice or decisions. In case law, within the Indian context, information disclosure is based on 
medical standards, and the culpability for negligence is established through deficiencies in service 
(physical/bodily harm). The guidelines provided in the Samira Kohli judgement regarding the ‘adequate 
information’ disclosure, the decision to apply the Bolam test, and the acceptance of the UK doctrine of real or 
valid consent during consent cases related to information disclosure reflect the dominance of the professional 
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standard of disclosure. Thus, through this analysis, we can understand that the ‘real or valid consent’ doctrine is 
a tool that only protects ‘physical body’. Protection from physical harm based on medical professional standards 
is considered to be the ultimate protected interest and not the patient’s requirements for information, indicating 
that the basic source for the legal principle of ‘real or valid consent’ is bodily integrity, in the Indian context. The 
patient’s entitlement to material information is not given utmost significance when bodily harm has not been 
established, based on medical professional standards.4 This demonstrates that patients’ receipt of material 
information depends on the physician’s information disclosure standard, which reflects that the patients’ right to 
all pertinent information does not play a significant role within the legal doctrine.  
 
Although the scholarship associated with autonomy, self-determination, and patient rights has advanced over the 
decades, the legal reasoning in India identifies and constructs the dominant identity of the ‘passive patient’ within 
the medical framework, overlooking the intrinsic significance of patients’ values and preferences. The reasoning 
is normatively justified based on the rhetoric of ‘doctor knows best’, along with consideration for ‘Indian ground 
realities’, including ‘poverty’, ‘not to increase cost of treatment’, ‘better health’, ‘respect for doctors’, ‘trust’, and 
‘implicit faith’. By applying the Bolam principle, combined with the belief that medical professionals act in the 
‘best interests to the patient’ and the construction of the ‘passive patient’ through rhetoric and narratives, the 
judgement overlooks the patient’s values, preferences, choices, and requirements for information during clinical 
interactions. Thus, patients’ capacity to make decisions is underestimated, and their ‘agency’ is disregarded. The 
statements in the judgement beg the following questions. Can we deny the role of patients’ values, preferences, 
choices, and requirements for information because the population of a country is poor, illiterate, and trusts medical 
professionals? Do being poor and illiterate mean that a person ‘cannot’ make decisions, have ‘choices and values’, 
or participate in medical decision-making process? Let’s assume that valid generalizations and social facts exist 
to support the claims that ‘Indian patients’ cannot make medical decisions; does it follow that their values and 
preferences, and right to participate in clinical interactions should not be acknowledged? These questions demand 
further study. Given the scope of this paper, in the next section I will restrict my argument to a narrative that 
would acknowledge the values and preferences of patients and that would recognise them as being active 
participants within a legal reasoning focused on patient-centred care through legal reform. 
                                               
4 Analysis based on 22 medical negligence cases which had referred to Samira Kohli case. Further details in 
(Subramani 2019). 
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‘Respect for persons’ as the way forward: A narrative towards ‘patient-centred care’  
 
Although some scholars are sceptical of the judicial influence over society, I make my arguments based on the 
consideration that the Supreme Court has historically played a critical role in transforming social concepts and 
influencing policy debates (Rosenberg 1993; Anthony and Jerome 2001; Vecera 2014; Mishler and Sheehan 1993; 
Scheingold 2010). Furthermore, evidence suggests that courts intensify national attention on policy issues 
(Flemming and Wood 1997; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Kostiner 2003). Many legal scholars who focus on the 
attitudinal models of judges have highlighted that court decisions are made based on the ‘case facts vis-à-vis their 
sincere ideological preferences and values’ (Segal 1997:28; Segal and Cover 1989). Given this understanding, I 
argue that a paradigm shift in the concept of a ‘patient’ as a ‘person’, who is an active participant in decision-
making processes, and a focus on effective communications within court judgements would have a strong 
influence to push for the culture of ‘patient-centred care’ in society. I, here, refer to the meaning of patient-centred 
care as ‘respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and values’ (Epstein et al. 2010), 
during clinical interactions. Many studies have established that patient-centred care improves both health 
outcomes and overall healthcare (Elwyn, Dehlendorf, et al. 2014; Barry and Edgman-Levitan 2012; Tinetti, Naik, 
and Dodson 2016; Elwyn, Lloyd, et al. 2014; Mead and Bower 2000). Specifically, patient-centred care improves 
healthcare by reducing social, economic, and demographic differences between doctors and patients and 
encouraging doctors to become aware of their patients’ values, beliefs, hopes, and other concerns (Willems et al. 
2005b; Beach et al. 2005; Saha, Beach, and Cooper 2008; Beach et al. 2007; Rao et al. 2007).  
 
In this patient-centric approach, the focus is on facilitating the patients’ understanding of information, instead of 
disregarding them as persons who ‘cannot’ understand or make decisions. In bioethics and philosophical literature, 
the perception tends towards patients to be treated as ‘persons’ (Devaney 2005; Brazier and Lobjoit 2005; 
Entwistle and Watt 2013; Beach et al. 2007; Dickert 2009), which has been justified by various scholars, based 
on the various positions and values that they hold (Entwistle and Watt 2013; Lysaught 2004). In this paper, I 
situate the ‘respect for persons’ concept by extending the larger understanding to a ‘person’ who must be treated 
with respect because they are agents who have values and preferences, which should be acknowledged within the 
legal context. The rhetoric and construction of a ‘passive patient’ within the court’s medical framework upholding 
‘medical authority’ provides normative justification for adopting the ‘medical professional standard’ within the 
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Indian context. The implication of the rhetoric is as follows: patients are not considered to be ‘agents’ or ‘persons’ 
who have values and preferences. 
Although established consensus exists in both medico-legal and bioethical literature that adult patients should be 
presumed to be competent and allowed to be decision-makers, unless rendered clinically or legally ‘incompetent’, 
I have demonstrated that, within the law in India, ‘passive patients’ have been constructed and deemed to be 
persons who do not have the ability to make decisions or be part of the decision-making process. According to 
legal and ethical literature, a person is competent if he or she is capable of understanding consequences and has 
the ability to make choices (Grisso and Appelbaum 1998; Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso 1995; Appelbaum and 
Grisso 1988; Abernethy 1991). I ascribe the underlying justification for ‘respect for persons’ in the Indian legal 
context to recognize that persons have their own values and beliefs and there are certain limitations on the abilities 
to perceive and know another person’s values, beliefs, judgements, and meanings (Darwall 1977, 2006; Buss 
1999). Therefore, ‘respect for persons’ first requires the recognition and acceptance that each individual possesses 
certain values, beliefs, and meanings, which endow them with the right to be treated as a ‘person’, and these 
characteristics lead each person to act in a specific manner within a  given context. Moreover, each individual, 
even a doctor, has certain limitations that they cannot account for, and uncertainties within medicine should be 
acknowledged (Braddock III et al. 1999; Han 2012; Dhawale, Steuten, and Deeg 2017; Politi, Han, and Col 2007). 
Thus, engaging with patients represents progress towards patient-centred care in every clinical setting, including 
in the Indian context, where disparities exist between doctors and patients, and attempts should be made to 
improve the healthcare system at both the micro and macro levels. 
Given the rhetoric in the court judgements, I argue that, first, the courts should acknowledge patients as ‘persons’ 
who may have different values and preferences with regards to medical treatment than those held by the treating 
doctors. Treating a patient as a person and who is a intersubjective being is a significant reflection of attitudes 
and actions that demonstrate ‘respect for persons’. Drawing on insights regarding this aspect of ‘respect’ from 
Darwall (1977) and Buss (1999), I argue that moral attitudes and behaviours that demonstrate respect in 
institutions can only be achieved when professionals recognize patients and family members as being ‘respect-
worthy’, as being ‘persons’, and constraining behaviours, attitudes, and actions that disrespect or disregard 
persons. Although the decision-making ‘capacity’ of patients is questioned by the observed rhetoric of the ‘passive 
patient’, the significance of effective communications and patient-centred care for overall health outcomes is well-
acknowledged across health services research and bioethics literature (Ishikawa, Hashimoto, and Kiuchi 2013; 
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Elwyn, Dehlendorf, et al. 2014; Barry and Edgman-Levitan 2012). The shift from a paternalistic approach to 
patient-centred care is much-appreciated and welcomed across disciplines (Brazier and Lobjoit 2005; Entwistle 
et al. 2010; Brazier 1987; Naik et al. 2009; Street et al. 2009; Wasserman and Navin 2018). This change reflects 
the acknowledgement of patients’ agency and respect for patients’ preferences and choices (Elwyn, Lloyd, et al. 
2014; Epstein et al. 2010). In the clinical context, patients should be treated as competent individuals, until they 
are proven to be otherwise (Abernethy 1991; Grisso and Appelbaum 1998; Faden, Beauchamp, and King 1986). 
However, this study found that patients are presumed to be ‘passive’. ‘Respect for persons’ in the law can be 
achieved by moving beyond the rhetoric of the ‘passive patient’ and acknowledging the values of patients and 
their roles during clinical interactions. Furthermore, a significant shift is required within the law, replacing the 
‘passive patient’ and the health/choice dichotomy with patient engagement and effective communication as 
components of clinical interactions that cultivate the culture of patient-centred care within the healthcare system. 
Because the purpose of law is to protect vulnerable individuals and to right wrongs, a shift in the narrative that 
views patients as ‘agents’ who play an active role during clinical interactions would drive both legal and moral 
progress towards ‘respect’ for both the legal context and society at large.  
Conclusion 
Over many decades, the concept of autonomy and self-determination has usurped medical paternalism, driving 
the concept of person-centred care to promote patients as participants during medical decision-making processes. 
However, as I illustrated in this paper, the rhetorical opinions in the law in the Indian context affirmed the idea of 
the ‘passive patient’, which must be addressed to acknowledge the role of patients’ values and preferences during 
decision making. The constructs of the ‘passive patient’ and ‘doctor knows best’ within the law provides a host 
of warrants to critically engage on patients’ rights. The rhetoric in the Samira Kohli case failed to acknowledge 
the voices of patients and disregarded their agency and person status by excluding their choices and preferences 
during medical decision-making processes, based on the notion of protecting their ‘health’. Thus, the rhetoric 
creates a dichotomy between health/choice for the patient, instead of considering the equal significance that each 
has on the overall well-being of patients and the decision-making process. The analysis in this paper demonstrates 
the need for constitutive rhetoric (White 1985), which refers to understanding the ‘rhetoric’ in legal processes, 
judicial opinions, and rules, and introducing new rhetoric or language into law. Furthermore, this paper illustrated 
the need to shift the construction of a ‘patient,’ to acknowledge the agentic status of a patient as a person who 
should be valued during medical decision-making processes and to acknowledge patient engagement and effective 
communication, to cultivate the culture of patient-centred care in society.  
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